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affirmation, including a notary or other person taking evidence in connection with any of
these proceedings."
Although, contrary to defendant's position, the police stopped Hicks' car as part of
an investigation, the characterization of the stop is not the only relevant consideration. In
accordance with the terms of the statute, the critical inquiry is whether defendant believed
that an official proceeding or investigation was pending or about to be instituted. Here,
defendant was involved in a drive-by shooting followed by police pursuit. Under the
circumstances, defendant must have been aware that the police had commenced an
investigation, and that he faced arrest and related judicial proceedings. Therefore, the
evidence and reasonable inferences supported the jury's determination that defendant
concealed the marijuana and assisted with the concealment of the gun in the belief that an
official proceeding or investigation was pending or about to be instituted.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm defendant's conviction for evidence tampering.
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inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable mir is must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted."
State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983); see also State v. Goddard 871 P.2d 540,
543 (Utah 1994); State v. Harlev. 982 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Utah App. 1999).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1999) provides:
A person commits a felony of the second degree if, believing that an official
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he:
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes anything with a purpose to
impair its verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation;....
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999) provides:
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of
an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests,
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for
such conduct.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of evidence tampering, a second-degree
felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1999), and one count of possession of a
controlled substance (89 grams of marijuana) with intent to distribute, a third-degree
felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1998) (R. 1-2).
Following a trial on April 9, 1998, a jury found defendant guilty as charged of
evidence tampering (R. 192). On the drug possession charge, the jury convicted
defendant of the lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance (id.).
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BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant appeals his conviction of evidence tampering, a second- degree felony
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction of the case in
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Was the evidence sufficient to support defendant's conviction
for evidence tampering where a bullet clip in defendant's
pocket matched a concealed gun used in a drive-by shooting
and defendant admitted that marijuana stashed under a car
seat was his?

In determining whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction, an
appellate court reviews the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn
from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury. The court reverses a jury

was sitting in the driver's seat (R. 314 at 9). Tl • car's windows were tinted, and Lea
could not see whether there were any passengers (R. 314 at 16). Lea let up on the gas a
little, looked over, and kept driving (R. 314 at 8). She drove further down 1400 South,
then turned and headed south (R. 314 at 9). She passed the four-way stop on Main Street
and 1600 South and traveled a few more blocks (R, 314 at 9-10).
Then Lea noticed the headlights of a car behind her (R. 314 at 10). She turned
again onto 1800 South and traveled on (R. 314 at 11). The other car reappeared, stopped
at an intersection (id). It was the same car Lea had seen behind the stores (id). Lea
turned onto another street, traveled a bit further, and saw the other car stop at the
intersection of 180 West and 1800 South (id). Lea turned again, and the other car
followed (R. 314 at 12).
Lea headed up a residential cul-de-sac (R. 314 at 12). As she and Mike drove
away, the other car stopped (id.).
The driver of the other car, Christopher Hicks, fired a gunshot at Lea and Mike
(id., R. 314 at 16). When Lea and Mike realized what was happening, Lea stopped the
car, and she and Mike ducked (R. 314 at 13). From her side mirror, Lea could see muzzle
blasts from the gun (id). The gunman fired between four and six shots (id).
Lea hastily pulled into a driveway (id). Hicks took off (id). Lea and Mike went
to Mike's parents' home and called the police (id.).

4

Before sentencing, defendant moved to arrest the judgment on the ground that the
evidence was insufficient to convict him of evidence tampering (R. 203-14). The trial
court summarily denied the motion when it imposed sentence (R. 268).
The trial court sentenced defendant to 1-15 years in prison on the evidence
tampering charge, and 0-5 years on the drug charge (R. 271). The court suspended the
sentences and placed defendant on 36 months probation (R. 270-71). The court also
suspended defendant's obligation to pay $15,000 infines,but ordered him to pay a
$1,110 surcharge (R. 270).
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 276, extension granted R. 274). He
does not challenge his conviction for possession of a controlled substance.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Shooting
Lea Peacock and her boyfriend Mike spent a quiet Sunday evening in Orem
watching a video (R. 314 at 6-7). When the movie ended in the early morning hours,
Mike decided he was hungry, and he and Lea ventured out in search of food (R. 314 at 7).
The trip nearly cost them their lives.
Lea and Mike drove to the Sconecutter, then headed west on 1400 South across
State Street (R. 314 at 7-8). Because of the hour, there were few cars on the road (R. 314
at 8).
Lea noticed a car behind some stores (R. 314 at 8-9). A "big guy with a pony tair
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officer through a patrol car window (R. 314 at 52-53).
Officers searched Hicks' vehicle at the scene (R. 314 at 85). They noticed that the
rear bench seat cushion was ajar (R. 314 at 87, 94). Under the seat cushion, the officers
found a bag containing 4 smaller baggies of marijuana on the right side where Todd had
been sitting (R. 314 at 74, 88, 93). The officers also searched the car's glove
compartment at the time of the stop (R. 314 at 102). They found papers, pictures, and a
cell phone, but no handgun (id).
At the police station, Officer Young told Hicks he would be charged with
marijuana possession (R. 314 at 89). Defendant, lying handcuffed on the floor about
three feet away, yelled out "[i]t is not his marijuana, it is my marijuana" (R. 314 at 90).
Defendant was searched again in connection with being booked into jail (R. 314 at
90-91). In one of defendant's pants pockets, officers found a handgun clip containing 9millimeter bullets (R. 314 at 91).
The next day, Officer Chris Hendrickson obtained a warrant to search the glove
box again (R. 314 at 104). He found that when the glove box was open, he could pull it
downward (R. 314 at 104). When the compartment was pulled down, two things
occurred: (1) a space behind the dashboard was exposed, and (2) the contents of the
compartment spilled onto the floor (R. 314 at 104-05).
Officer Hendrickson reached into the space behind the dashboard and pulled out a
Branco 9-millimeter handgun (R. 314 at 106-07). The gun contained a thirteen-bullet clip
6
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defendant tampered wuh evidence in the belief that an investigation or official proceeding
was pending or about to be instituted.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE AND REASONABLE INFERENCES
SUPPORTED THE JURY'S VERDICT BINDING
DEFENDANT GUILTY OF EVIDENCE TAMPERING
Defendant asserts that the evidence did not support the jury's guilty verdict on the
evidence tampering charge. Appellant's Brief at 24. He claims that no direct evidence
showed that defendant tampered with evidence, and that, in fact, Todd's testimony that he
did not see defendant hide either the marijuana or the gun tended to exonerate him.
Appellant's Brief at 19. Defendant asserts that the conviction was impermissibly based
on speculation and conjecture. Id.
"We will affirm the jury verdict as 'long as there is some evidence, including
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the elements of the crime can
reasonably be made.'" State v. Wood. 868 P.2d 70, 87 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v.
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)). On the facts of this case, the elements of
evidence tampering were that defendant, (1) believing that an official proceeding or
investigation was about to be instituted, (2) either concealed the gun or the marijuana to
impair the availability of the gun or marijuana in the proceeding or investigation, or
encouraged or intentionally aided another in such concealment. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-88

u nh n i u iHiiliM , pi »"sent (R. 314 at 107). The clip was identical to the clip found in •
defendant's pants pocket-VR. M < * "~PV ^

--i-K-u
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marijuana and did not observe that the seal i •* JHI « w us npi e \i \ 14 at 32-33, lo8-o9).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
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Defendant's claim that the police stop of Hicks' car was mil iin iil'k nil |imcmlim.'
or investigation lacks merit. On the lacts ol this easi.1 ilii" JIII ,; properly found itial
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the jury. The jury is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of any witness's testimony."
State v. Haves. 860 P.2d 968, 973 (Utah App. 1993) (citing State v. Jonas. 793 P.2d 902,
904-05 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990)). Furthermore, "[a]n
appellate court reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence does not reweigh the
evidence or invv tigate witness credibility." Butterfield v. Cook. 817 P.2d 333, 337 (Utah
App.), cert, denied. 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991) (citing State v. Lamm. 606 P.2d 229, 231
(Utah 1980)).
Defendant fails to mention that the magazine found in defendant's pocket was
identical to the clip found in the gun from which the shots were fired. Although
defendant does acknowledge that the prosecution introduced the magazine into evidence,
he fails to acknowledge the evidentiary importance of either the magazine or the fact that
it was found in defendant's pocket. Appellant's Brief at 14.
The fact that the clip taken from defendant's pocket matched the clip found in the
gun Hicks used to shoot at Lea and Mike was important because it gives rise to at least
two reasonable inferences supporting defendant's conviction for evidence tampering.
First, the jury could reasonably infer from defendant's possession of the clip that the gun
was defendant's, and that he passed it forward to Hicks so that Hicks could fire at Lea and
Mike.2 Since the gun was used in the commission of a crime, defendant would have an

2

Of course, since the gun was stolen, it did not really "belong" to defendant, Hicks,
or anyone other than the true owner.
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Concealment of the Gun. Defendant's argument
statement that he observe,;
Appellant
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Todd's

the glove compartment.
*

i

was nut required to believe Todd's

whole ui in part. "[Determinations of witness credibility
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without placing his arm into a three-inch space next to the stereo inside the dashboard,
and that he had difficulty retrieving the gun even though he did not attempt to reach it
from the driver's seat (R. 314 at 106). Clearly, Hicks, who was driving, must have
received assistance in hiding the gun.
Although Hicks was most likely aided byfront-seatpassenger Norton in the actual
concealment ui the gun, the matching clip was in defendant's pocket. Hendrickson
testified that magazines for handguns are not interchangeable, and that the clip found in
defendant's pocket would have been manufactured for the Branco 9-millimeter handgun
alone, and was in fact identical to the clip in the gun (R. 314 at 108-10). He also testified
that he had extensive experience with firearms, having worked at Wolfe's, Udisco,
Harmon's and Zinick's, and he had never seen that brand of handgun (R. 314 at 108).
The most reasonable inference from the officer's testimony is that Hicks, Norton,
and defendant must have been in collusion during the entire episode, including the
concealment of the handgun. It was no coincidence that the clip in defendant's pocket fit
the gun that Hicks fired and Norton helped conceal. Defendant must have participated in
concealing the gun by either encouraging Hicks to hide the gun or by pocketing the spare
clip.
Concealment of Marijuana. Although defendant acknowledges that two officers
testified that they found marijuana under the displaced rear seat cushion, and a third
testified that the marijuana was stuffed down into the cushions, he fails to analyze the
12
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selectively focuses on the evidence most favorable to his position and fails to
acknowledge or fully discuss the implications of inculpatory evidence. In so doing,
defendant has failed to meet his burden to adequately marshal the evidence. This Court
therefore should not address his claims. Vessev. 967 P.2d at 966. In any event, however,
the direct evidence and reasonable inferences were sufficient to prove the elements of
evidence tampering beyond a reasonable doubt.4
POINT II
THE JURY CORRECTLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT
TAMPERED WITH EVIDENCE IN THE BELIEF THAT
AN INVESTIGATION OR OFFICIAL PROCEEDING
WAS PENDING OR ABOUT TO BE INSTITUTED
Defendant's claim that the police stop of the car was not an official proceeding or
investigation is without merit. First, as defendant candidly admits, his contention is
contrary to existing law. Appellant's Brief at 25-26. Second, his claim defies the plain
language of the applicable statutes. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1999) makes it a crime
to tamper with evidence in the belief that "an official proceeding or investigation is
pending or about to be instituted." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-501 (1999) provides that an
official proceeding means "any proceeding before a legislative, judicial, administrative,
or other governmental body or official authorized by law to take evidence under oath or

defendant's suggestion that the jury's verdict was based on racism is without
merit. Appellant's Brief at 20. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the jury
based its decision on any impermissible racial or ethnic bias.
14

significance of the testimony, \\I\I\ Ham •» Brief at 12-15. fn fact,, the evidence tliiii ilie
back seat cushion was ajai is highly relevant, since the charge ot evident
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reasonable inference that the marijuana was qi lickly stashed while defendant and his
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sufficiency of the evidence, a defendant *> • i > h u<*
mars

idence and inferences supporting the jui> •

defendant

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that on this 2

day of

\\ dl&+±\}Qj^.

1999.1 mailed,

postage prepaid, two accurate copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief to Sheldon R.
Carter, 3325 North University, Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84604.

16

